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By Paul F. Rothstein
Amendments to the
Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure
NUMEROUS changes in the rules govern-
ing criminal trials in federal court have
been in effect for four months. Some are
major and some are minor, but they
should be studied carefully by lawyers
handling criminal cases.
Amendments have been made to:
* Rule 6, on disclosure of grand jury
information,
e Rule 11, on nolo contendere and
guilty pleas, plus a new harmless error
rule,
" Rule 12, on Jencks-type disclosures,
" Rule 12.2, on testimony on mental
condition of the defendant and mental
examinations,
* Rule 23, permitting 11-memberjuries
and
e Rule 32, on correcting pre-sentence
reports and withdrawal of pleas.
The grand jury
Rule 6(e)(2) contains a general pro-
hibition against disclosure of "matters
occurring before the grand jury." Sub-
paragraph 6(e)(3) contains exceptions to
this prohibition. The exceptions gener-
ally have to do with the circumstances in
which disclosure can be made to other
government attorneys or personnel as
well as when a court can order special
disclosure-for example, to the defen-
dant. The amendments add another
exception, permitting disclosure when it
is made by the attorney for the govern-
ment to another federal grand jury.
The amendmentS also add Rule
6(e)(3)(D) containing procedures for
applying to the court for disclosure pre-
liminarily to or in connection with ajudi-
cial proceeding. The court always had
There are changes
in the rules
concerning the grand
jury, nolo contendere
pleas, Jencks-type
disclosures and
withdrawal of pleas.
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power to order disclosure in this situa-
tion. It is the procedures that are new,
clarifying matters such as: to which
court application must be made;
whether the application may be ex
parte; who must be given notice of the
hearing; and closure of the hearing.
The amendment as originally pro-
posed provided that the government has
a right to an ex parte hearing when it
was seeking the grand jury information
"for its own use." The ABA Criminal
Justice Section objected. noting exam-
ples in which the government sought to
use grand jury information for civil pur-
poses. While not meeting the point fully,
a change was made to give the court dis-
cretion in the matter.
The amendments probably do not
substantially affect several cases
decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
grand jury area last term.
In United States v. Sells Engineer-
ing Inc., 103 S.Ct. 3133 (1983), it was
held that provisions of the rule authoriz-
ing more-or-less automatic disclosure to
attorneys for the government did not
allow disclosure to Justice Department
attorneys working on a civil fraud case.
The attorneys would have to apply
under the rules requiring a court order
and a showing of particularized need.
The Court in another case declined to
recognize a particularized need when an
application was made by the Internal
Revenue Service for a civil tax audit.
See 103 S.Ct. 3164 (1983). A third case
refused to abrogate the particularized
need requirement when a state attorney
general requested grand jury materials
to facilitate a civil antitrust action,
despite provisions of the antitrust laws
arguably suggesting the contrary. See
103 S.Ct. 1356 (1983).
Another new provision. Rule 6(e)(6),
requires that records, orders and sub-
poenas relating to grand jury proceed-
ings must be kept under seal "to the
extent and for such time as is necessary
to prevent disclosure of matters occur-
ring before a grand jury." This con-
ceivably could be an obstacle to defense
attorneys wishing to ascertain whether
there was a proper order authorizing a
special grand jury or a proper order
extending the life of a grand jury, or
wishing to learn the identity of people to
whom the government attorney dis-
closed grand jury information. But most
of these problems can be taken care of
by a proper motion under Rule 6
(e)(3)(C)(ii), which provides that the
court may at the request of the defen-
dant disclose grand jury matters when
certain showings are made.
Pleas
It often happens that criminal defen-
dants will plead guilty or nolo conten-
dere primarily because they lost an
important pre-trial motion-for exam-
ple, a motion to suppress evidence. In
most instances, appeal of adverse rul-
ings on pre-trial motions must await the
end of the case. Interlocutory appeals
are rarely allowed. A plea of guilty has
been held to foreclose nearly all rights of
defendants to appeal. The consequence
of this is that defendants who lose a pre-
trial motion but feel they may succeed
Rule 11(a) (2) has been
added so defendants can
condition a guilty or
"nolo" plea on the
outcome of an appeal
on any specified
pre-trial motion.
on appeal may well be tempted to plead
not guilty and put the system to the
expense of a trial in order to preserve
their right to appeal.
To avoid this, Rule 1l(a)(2) has been
added to permit defendants to condition
their plea of guilty or nolo contendere
on the outcome of an appeal on any
specified pre-trial motion. If the defen-
dant prevails on the appeal he is allowed
to withdraw his plea. The amendment,
however, requires the approval of the
court and the consent of the government
before this conditional plea can be
entered.
Rule 11 as a whole sets forth detailed
procedures concerning how a guilty or
nolo contendere plea must be taken.
Included are provisions instructing the
judge how to ensure that the defendant
has full information about the con-
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sequences of a guilty or nolo contendere
plea and to ensure that any plea is vol-
untary. The rule also includes steps the
judge and attorneys must take to have a
valid plea agreement and provisions reg-
ulating the acceptance and rejection by
the court of a plea agreement.
The new amendments add a final sub-
division to the rule providing that "any
variance from the procedures required
by this rule which does not affect sub-
stantial rights shall be disregarded."
This is a "harmless error" provision. It
stems from the fact that at least one line
of authority was developing that any
variance from the detailed prescriptions
of Rule 11 would vitiate a guilty plea and
the conviction on which it is based.
In some instances, however, variances
from Rule 11 procedures plainly could
not have affected the defendant's deci-
sion to plead guilty. In one case a trial
judge failed to advise the guilty pleader
of the maximum years of special super-
vised parole following imprisonment, as
required by the rule, and instead said
that added parole is "generally in the
neighborhood of three years." United
States v. Peters, No. 77-1700 (4th Cir.,
Dec. 22, 1978). Suppose the judge failed
to explain what a conspiracy charge
meant with precision. United States v.
Coronado, 554 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1977).
Suppose some essential element of the
crime was not mentioned but the defen-
dant's responses clearly indicated his
awareness of that element. McCarthy v.
United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). Sup-
pose the judge understated the max-
imum penalty, but the penalty actually
imposed did not exceed that indicated,
as happened in Coronado, above. Or
suppose the judge failed to tell the
defendant that statements' he made in
connection with his plea may be used
against him in a prosecution for perjury
or false statement.
In all of these situations, although a
required piece of information had been
omitted by the judge, the variance
would probably be considered harmless
under the new amendment.
Jencks Act disclosures
Rule 12(i) is new. It extends Rule
26.2-which contains both the principles
of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 and
so-called reverse-Jencks principles-to
hearings on motions to suppress evi-
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dence in advance of the trial.
Rule 26.2, which speaks in terms of
trial witnesses rather than witnesses at
pre-trial suppression hearings, requires
essentially that certain prior statements
made by a prosecution or defense wit-
ness must be disclosed by the proponent
of the witness to the other side but only
after the witness testifies, and only if the
statement deals with the same subject
matter as the testimony. The theory is
that the statement may be useful as
impeachment. An entire body of case
law has developed concerning what
kinds of statements qualify for dis-
closure. The drafters of the amendments
felt that the credibility of witnesses tes-
tifying at hearings on pre-trial suppres-
sion motions was as important as the
credibility of witnesses at trial, and so
the same methods of evaluation should
apply.
Rule 12(i) further provides that, for
purposes of the disclosure of prior state-
ments, a law enforcement officer shall
be deemed a witness called by the gov-
ernment, regardless of which side calls
him. For example, the defense may wish
to call the law officer who conducted the
search and who has information the
defense believes indicates the illegality
of the seizure. The officer can be
expected to be sympathetic to the gov-
ernment. The government may have
prior statements of his relating to the
search and seizure that should be dis-
closed. The amendment applies to all
law enforcement officers, state or
federal.
The provision concerning law enforce-
ment officers also provides that, before
the statements are disclosed, the court
shall excise portions of the prior state-
ment containing privileged matter. The
primary concern was protection of the
identity of informants. The Criminal Jus-
tice Section of the American Bar Asso-
ciation criticized this provision because
it may suggest that privileged material is
not subject to excision under other
applications of Rule 12(i), for example,
when the witness is not a law enforce-
ment officer, or under Rule 26.2 or the
Jencks Act.
Testimony on mental condition
Rule 12.2(a) provides for pre-trial
notice that the defendant intends to rely
on the insanity defense. This provision
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remains unchanged, but Rule 12.2(b),
relating to advance notice of defendant's
expert witnesses, has been amended and
broadened.
Prior to the amendments, the rule
required the defense to notify the gov-
ernment of its intention to introduce
expert testimony relating to "mental dis-
ease, defect or other condition bearing
upon the issue of whether he [the defen-
dant] had the mental state required for
the offense." The amended rule would
require this notice to be given by the
defense when expert testimony is
intended to be introduced on "any men-
tal condition of the defendant bearing on
his guilt." This is an expansion. The
mental condition need no longer relate
to the mental state required for the
offense. It may relate to anything having
to do with guilt-for example, the com-
mission of the act itself, the actus reus
as opposed to the mens rea.
Currently emerging in the law are a
number of mental conditions used as
defenses when the mental condition is
addressed to the act itself or to some
other non-mens rea element of the
offense. Defense experts have testified
on the defendant's susceptibility to
influence to make out the defense of
entrapment, United States v. Perl, 584
F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1978); his incapability
of violent or aggressive acts against oth-
ers, in order to indicate the unlikelihood
that he committed the charged violent
criminal act, United States v. Webb, 625
F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1980); and to other
mental traits making the act less likely
or making certain defenses more likely.
There was ambiguity, before the amend-
ments, as to whether the pre-trial notice
required by the rule extended to these
kinds of experts.
The expansion of the notice rule to
embrace these new experts creates
some problems. For example, the rule
does not specify that any details must be
included in the notice. It has been con-
sidered adequate under the rule simply
to state that "the defense intends to
introduce an expert under Rule 12.2(b)."
This perfunctory notice was adequate to
alert the prosecution to the nature of the
defense and the type of expert that
would be testifying. This usually meant
insanity, intoxication, narcotics impair-
ment or mental deficiency, interfering
with knowledge or intention. In the con-
text of an actual case it was not too dif-
ficult to guess the nature.
With the expansion of the rule, the
possibilities become more numerous and
the difficulty correspondingly greater.
Added to the possibilities now are men-
tal qualities that might bear on the actus
reus (the doing of the act), entrapment
and other elements and defenses. It
might be desirable to require some addi-
tional details in the notice. But this
makes the defendant disgorge much of
his potential defense, which may be
undesirable. There may be a question of
the constitutionality of requiring any
notice that goes beyond notice of
insanity or mens rea defenses.
Rule 12.2(c) authorizing the court to
order the defendant to submit to a men-
tal examination is correspondingly
expanded so that the type of examina-
tion is no longer confined to a "psychi-
atric" examination. It now covers a
"mental" examination by a psychiatrist
or "other expert."
The rule now provides that state-
ments made by the defendant in a court-
ordered mental examination cannot be
used on any issue except "an issue
respecting a mental condition on which
the defendant has introduced testi-
mony." The prohibition also embraces
testimony by an expert based on such
statements and any other "fruits of the
statement."
New Rule 12.2(e) provides that if
notice of intention (to plead insanity or
to introduce an expert on any mental
condition) is later withdrawn, the fact
that notice was given or that it was
withdrawn is not admissible against the
person giving the notice in any subse-
quent civil or criminal proceeding.
Eleven-member juries
It occasionally happens in federal
criminal trials that, after the jury has
retired to consider its verdict and the
alternate jurors perhaps have been dis-
charged, one of the regular jurors
becomes seriously incapacitated and is
unable to continue. Declaring a mistrial
and ordering a new trial could involve
considerable expense and delay. In
United States v. Meinster, 484 F.Supp.
442 (S.D. Fla. 1980), 12 defendants were
named in a 36-count, 100-page indict-
ment for complicated racketeering and
white-collar offenses. The trial took four
months. Before the jury retired, multiple
defense counsel declined the trial
judge's request to agree to a jury of
fewer than 12 should a juror become
unable to continue during the delibera-
tions. A day later, after the jury retired
for deliberations, one juror had a heart
attack and was excused. Defense coun-
sel again rejected the notion that the
deliberations should continue with the
remaining 11 jurors. Other cases were on
the docket awaiting trial, so that retrial
not only would have been costly but
also would have delayed other cases
that were entitled to speedy trial.
Defense counsel remained adamant in
not agreeing to trial by less than 12
jurors.
In situations like this, if a new trial is
to be avoided, the choice is between
allowing deliberation to continue with 11
jurors or calling on one of the alternate
jurors to serve, assuming that there is
no reasonable prospect of recovery of
the disabled juror. But alternate jurors
are selected to fill in before deliberations
have begun. If an alternate is called into
service after deliberations have begun,
the alternate juror ordinarily will not
have had the benefit of, nor exerted
effect on, the earlier discussions. Or-
dering the jurors to begin delibera-
tions anew is an incomplete answer
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because the alternate will still have
missed the earlier discussions. Normally
he will not be as able to influence the
otherjurors. The alternate may have been
exposed to outside influences and, as a
new juror, may feel intimidated by the
other jurors.
The law prior to the amendment was
unclear as to what should be done. Rule
23 seemed to prohibit trial by fewer than
12 without the consent of the parties.
Amended Rule 23(b) now provides that
even absent a stipulation of the parties
that if a juror must be excused after
deliberations have begun, the court in its
discretion may accept as valid a verdict
by I1 jurors.
In Williams v. Florida. 399 U.S. 78
(1970), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of a six-person jury
in Florida, so an li-person jury also
would be acceptable. It should be noted
that the amendments do not authorize
less-than-unanimous verdicts. The It-
person verdict still would have to be
unanimous.
The new amendment gives the judge
discretion whether to order a new trial
or to allow an 11-person deliberation. No
standards are provided for the exercise
of that discretion, but the advisory com-
mittee suggests that the length of the
trial and expense are to be weighed in
the balance. What is to be weighed on
the other side of the balance is less
clear, as is how much weight it should
be given.
Pre-sentence investigation report
Rule 32 provides for a pre-sentence
investigation report to be supplied to the
judge and (with exceptions) to the defen-
dant and his counsel for comments prior
to sentencing. The new Rule 32(c)(3)(D)
provides for the first time what is to be
done if an inaccuracy is alleged or
shown. As to each matter controverted,
the judge must make a finding or deter-
mine that no such finding is necessary
because the matter will not be taken into
account in sentencing. A written record
must accompany any copy of the report
furnished to the Bureau of Prisons or
Parole Commission, which might later
rely on the report.
Plea withdrawal
Rule 32(d) deals with withdrawal of a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere. Prior
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to the amendment the rule provided that
a motion to withdraw a plea could be
made before a sentence was imposed or
the imposition of it suspended. It left
ambiguous what standard the judge was
to apply and whether these provisions
applied after a tentative sentence had
been imposed while the defendant was
remanded for study under 18 U.S.C. §
4205(c). The rule (in another part)
provided that, to correct "manifest
injustice," the court could set aside a
judgement of conviction even after sen-
tence and permit the defendant to with-
draw his plea. Thus the rule did provide
a standard ("manifest injustice") but
only for the post-sentence motion.
The difficulty was that after convic-
tion and sentence, precisely the same
result could be accomplished if the
defendant proceeded under 28 U.S.C. §
What happens when
a juror is unable to
continue in deliberations?
New Rule 23(b) allows
the court to accept
as valid a verdict
by 11 jurors.
2255, which provides for a collateral
attack on a conviction. The standard
under Section 2255 seems to be very
similar to the "manifest injustice" stan-
dard. Under Section 2255 the standard is
that stated in Hill v. United States, 368
U.S. 424 (1962): "A fundamental defect
which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice" or "an omission
inconsistent with the rudimentary
demands of fair procedure."
Some of the things that defendants
have felt invalidate a plea under one pro-
cedure or the other are: that there exists
a complete constitutional bar to convic-
tion of the offense charged, see Brooks
v. United States, 424 F.2d 425 (5th Cir.
1970);- that the defendant was incompe-
tent at -the time of his plea, see United
States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); that the bargain the prosecu-
tor made with defendant was not kept,
see Walters v. Harris, 460 F.2d 988 (4th
Cir. 1972); that he was not advised of the
parole term or sentence he might
receive; that the defendant expected a
lower sentence, see United States v.
White, 572 F.2d 1007 (4th Cir. 1978); and
that the defendant's family coerced him
to make the plea, see Wojtowicz v.
United States, 550 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.
1977).
The amendment clarifies some ambi-
guities of this rule and in some measure
eases the standard applied. First, it
provides that the rule may not be used
after sentencing. At that point the only
route is a direct appeal or a Section 2255
attack; the rule itself is confined to the
period prior to sentencing. During this
period the amendment provides a stan-
dard: the generous one of "any fair and
just reason." The amendment also
makes clear that the rule applies to
motions made after provisional sentenc-
ing but before the sentence is finalized
pending study of the defendant.
The practical effect of this amendment
probably will not be great because most
cases seem to have applied a "fair and
just" standard to the pre-sentence situa-
tion anyway and, in the post-sentence
situation, seemed to equate the "man-
ifest injustice" standard of the rule with
the standard under Section 2255.
Other amendments
Rule 35, on correction or reduction of
sentence, is amended so that a sentence
can be reduced within 120 days after the
sentence is imposed or probation is
revoked; in addition to the other situa-
tions permitted by that rule. The rule
previously implied that, in the probation
revocation situation, the sentence, if it
were going to be reduced, had to be
reduced at the time of the revocation.
Some minor changes were made to
Rule 55 (recordkeeping by the trial court
in criminal cases). Rule 58 (forms) and
the appendix (setting forth some exam-
ple forms for lawyers) were abrogated.
(Paul F. Rothstein is a professor at
the Georgetown University Law Center
and is chairperson of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Com-
mittee of the ABA Criminal Justice
Section.)
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